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SUMMARY In recent years, spectrum sharing has received much atten-
tion as a technique for more efficient spectrum use. In the case in which all
providers are cooperative, spectrum sensing can easily be realized and can
improve user throughput (on average). If that is not the case, providers are
not cooperative, i.e., spectrum trading, spectrum bands are rented to pro-
mote spectrum sharing. To ensure more profit, however, non-cooperative
providers must correctly estimate the fluctuation of the number of con-
nected users to be able to determine the offered channel price. In this paper,
we propose a spectrum sharing method to achieve both higher throughput
and provider profit via appropriate pricing using a disaggregate behavioral
model. Finally, we confirm the effectiveness of the proposed method using
simulation experiments.
key words: dynamic spectrum allocation, spectrum sharing, user behavior,
provider profit
1. Introduction
The mobile communication environment has improved sig-
nificantlywith recent advances inwireless transmission tech-
nologies such as WiFi [1], WiMAX [2], and LTE [3]. The
number of mobile users worldwide is approaching satura-
tion; however, the amount of mobile traffic continues to
rapidly increase because people are making ever-increasing
use of multimedia services, e.g., music and movies, via mo-
bile networks on smartphones. Therefore, significantly more
spectral resources are needed to maintain and improve the
quality of services provided to users. However, spectral re-
sources, which are appropriate for data communication, are
limited, such that this shortage has become an important
problem [4].
In heterogeneous wireless networks, the spectrum shar-
ing technique dynamically assigns spectrum channels to pri-
mary systems (PSs, i.e., licensees, spectrum owners) and to
secondary systems (SSs), which have no priority access to
the channel [5]. When there are multiple secondary systems
in an area covered by the primary system, the total wireless
communication capacity of the area increases, because two
or more secondary systems can use the same spectrum if
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they are not adjacent.
In the case in which all providers are cooperative, spec-
trum sharing can be realized easily, which improves user
throughput (on average) [6]. In the case in which providers
are not cooperative, the primary system does not share the
spectrum, because the user throughput of the primary system
degrades. Therefore, spectrum trading in which spectrum
bands are bought and sold by systems is used to promote
spectrum sharing [7]. Pricing plays an important role in
spectrum trading because it indicates the value of the spec-
trum resources and determines assignments.
The market equilibrium approach is one possible
method for solving the pricing problem [8]. Based on mar-
ket theory, the price is set such that it balances the supply
and demand for spectrum resources. As a result, both pri-
mary and secondary systems are satisfied with the price.
However, in studies using the market equilibrium approach,
providers charge connected users using price per bandwidth
or achieved throughput so as to guess the profit and losses
caused by spectrum sharing. Therefore, these methods can-
not be applied to current widespread communication envi-
ronments such as monthly fixed fee model where a user pays
a constant charge for his/her communications regardless of
its traffic volume or throughput.
Under fixed fees for users, the revenue of the system de-
pends on the fluctuation in the number of users connected to
the system. For this reason, systems must correctly estimate
the fluctuation in the number of connected users and use the
fluctuation to determine an adequate price to ensure greater
profit surely. Therefore, it is important to accurately model
user behavior.
In this paper, we propose a spectrum sharing method to
achieve both higher throughput and increased provider profit
based on careful control of pricing. The user behavior of the
selecting system is modeled using a random utility model
that utilizes a stochastic decision process. To estimate user
behavior, systems exploit a disaggregate behavioral model.
The parameters of the disaggregate behavioral model can
be estimated from the data consisting of alternatives chosen
by users and the condition of systems at the selection time.
To maximize profit, a secondary system sets the offering
channel price to a value less than the increase in revenue ob-
tained for the estimation. Additionally, the primary system
decides the number of assignment channels and which sec-
ondary systems are targets of channel assignment (without
interference), and maximizes the profit of the system.
Copyright © 2017 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers
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Fig. 1 Access point selection in WiMAX/WiFi integrated network.
2. Related Works
2.1 Heterogeneous Wireless Network
Although several wireless network systems have been devel-
oped independently of each other, they should be integrated
for seamless access by users. Therefore, integrated networks
such asWiMAX andWiFi integrated networks [9], [10] have
been actively studied. In integrated networks, high-quality
communication is achievable using two or more network
systems as complementary access resources. In [9], the po-
tential of the integration of WiMAX and residential WiFi
access is shown, in addition to the win–win situation for
both WiFi and WiMAX operators.
As shown in Fig. 1, in the integrated network, a mo-
bile user obtains access to the best wireless system, which
is chosen based on the criteria of the user (e.g., application
and mobility) and the system (e.g., traffic congestion). For
example, a moving user should be assigned to a WiMAX
network so as to obtain continuous coverage. On the other
hand, a user in an urban area with heavy traffic should be
connected to a WiFi network so as to obtain higher through-
put. Therefore, users can have better communications and
systems can achieve load balancing [10].
In addition, to achieve seamless accesses, not only hor-
izontal handover (meaning switching an access point within
the same type of system) but also vertical handover (meaning
switching between different systems) [11] are performed.
2.2 Spectrum Sharing
Integrated wireless networks assume that each wireless sys-
tem uses the spectrum band that is prescribed by law, such
that even if one system temporarily has unused spectrum re-
sources, they cannot be used by another system. To overcome
this problem, dynamic spectrum access (DSA) technology,
also referred to as dynamic spectrum management, has re-
ceived much attention [12].
DSA significantly increases opportunities for spectrum
sharing. New types of spectrum sharing enabled by DSA
include higher-power transmission at timeswhen the primary
systems in a band area are inactive, trading of spectrum
access rights, and collaboration among secondary systems
[13].
In this paper, we focus on spectrum property rights
[12] in spectrum sharing in which providers trade spectrum-
exclusive access rights to use spectrum resources. On this
occasion, a spectrum owner (or primary system) assigns its
licensed spectrum to secondary systems, which have no pri-
ority access to the band. Because two or more secondary
systems can use the same spectrum when they are not adja-
cent, the total wireless communication capacity increases.
To search for an assignment patternwithout interference
between adjacent systems, a centralized control server [14]–
[16] controls spectrum allocation and access procedures. In
[16], a centralized server called the spectrum manager con-
trols the spectrum assignment and collects the information
necessary for assignment.
From a game theoretical perspective, spectrum sharing
can be classified based on spectrum allocation behaviors, i.e.,
cooperative or non-cooperative [17]. Cooperative providers
always cooperate with each other to reach a common goal
such as the maximization of total throughput. On the other
hand, non-cooperative providers aim to maximize their own
interests.
In the following section, spectrum sharing methods for
cooperative and non-cooperative providers are explained.
(1) Spectrum Sharing Method for Cooperative Providers
In game theory, a cooperative game is a game in which
groups of players enforce cooperative behavior. In such a
cooperative environment, primary and secondary systems
cooperate with each other to increase social welfare. The
simple real-world situation is that in which the same provider
owns both primary and secondary systems.
According to [6] spectrum sharing improves the average
user throughput. The method exploits the number of users
who connect to the systems as the evaluation value of the
genetic algorithm (GA). By using GA under the constraint
that it disallow assignment of the same spectrum to adja-
cent access points, it is possible to assign channels without
interference among selected access points.
In general, however, providers are usually selfish to
obtain higher profit, so that they are NOT cooperative.
(2) Spectrum Sharing Method for Non-Cooperative
Providers
Non-cooperative (or competitive, selfish) providers indepen-
dently make decisions and pursue their own profit. Because
spectrum sharing degrades the primary system throughput
because of the decrease in the primary available spectrum,
spectrum tradingmethods are proposed. This method adopts
money trading as a motivation for spectrum sharing [8].
Price, therefore, plays an important role in spectrum trading
because it indicates the value of the spectrum resources and
determines assignments.
To solve the pricing problem, several approaches such
as auctions [18], market equilibria [19], and learning algo-
rithms [20] have been used. In [18], each secondary system
bids for an additional channel. In [19], the price is set such
that it balances the supply and demand for the spectrum. [20]
proposed an optimal pricing scheme for bandwidth sharing
in WiMAX/WiFi integrated networks using the Stackelberg
game and learning algorithms. The Stackelberg equilibrium
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is defined as the strategy profile thatmaximizes the primary’s
payoff while the secondary players play their best responses.
The learning algorithm is adopted for secondary systems to
store information regarding user bandwidth demands in the
population and update the demand function (e.g., the price-
demand function) until profit for the secondary systems is
maximized.
In fact, however, such a pay-as-you-go-based charging
system is not widely used and a monthly fixed fee model is
typically applied. In a fixed fee system, a provider has no
need to have such a short-term motivation.
2.3 User Model
We describe the disaggregate behavioral model [21] that is
widely used in the civil engineering planning field to predict
user behaviors.
Disaggregate behavioral modeling provides mathemat-
ical representations of traveler preferences to estimate the
utility or value that travelers place on different features or
benefits. Unlike aggregate modeling, disaggregate behav-
ioral modeling can use fewer samples, and thus, it is used
widely as a technique to predict the chosen action in trans-
portation and civil engineering planning [22]. In addition,
several existing studies adopt disaggregate behavioral mod-
eling to choose among communication systems [23], [24].
The model is based on the random utility model, in which
the preference for each choice of named utility is introduced
and in which preference stochastically fluctuates.
The random utility model of choice is an econometric
representation of maximizing behavior. This model regards
utility as stochastically fluctuating, such that, alternatively,
the utility might change. Mathematically, the model is sim-
ply performs utility maximization where utility is treated as
a random function.
Symbolically, let Γ be a set of alternatives and U be a
set of real-valued functions defined over the elements of Γ.
Then, the random model asserts that for a decision-maker
faced with a choice set I ∈ Γ, there exists a utility function
Ui used to select an alternative i ∈ I, given by
Ui = Vi +  i, (1)
whereVi is the observed final real part and  i is the unknown
realization of a random variable  . Finally, the probability
qi of selecting the alternative i is given by the following
equation:
qi = Prob [Ui ≤ Uj, ∀ j ∈ I, j , i]. (2)
Among random utility models, the most successful
method was proposed by McFadden [21]. He assumed that
the random parts of utility functions are independent and
identically Gumbel distributed, as given by
Prob [ i ≥ ] = e−e−(+αi ) . (3)
His specification yields the logit model, which is given by
the following equation:
qi =
eVi−αi∑
j∈I eVj−αj
. (4)
In applications, Vi , which is the deterministic part of the
utility function, is always assumed to be linear-in-parameters
with an additive disturbance representation; αi is modeled
as a fixed number, independently of person. Because this
postulate absorbs a random portion of the utility, qi and Vi
can be written as
qi =
eVi∑
j∈I eVj
, (5)
Vi =
∑
l
θlXil, (6)
where parameter θ is to be estimated and Xil is the lth at-
tribute for alternative i. θl is a coefficient of disaggregate
behavioral model. It is a kind of weight to indicate the im-
pact of attribute l. In other words, larger θl means Xl is more
influential for users’ decision.
To apply the disaggregate behavioral model to network
selection, we consider a scenario in which a user chooses
an action from among connecting to the primary system,
connecting to the secondary system, and cancelling the con-
nection. This set of choices means that if there is a user
who can connect to either WiMAX or WiFi, the choice set I
consists of: alternative 1, to connect to the primary system
(WiMAX); alternative 2, to connect to the secondary system
(WiFi); and alternative 3, to not connect to any systems.
Let si denote a system selected based on alternative i.
Then, s1 is the primary system (p) and s2 is the secondary
system (s). In the state of system si in which the number of
users connecting to system is n and the number of available
channels is c, the determinate utility for a user to choose i in
Eq. (6) can be represented as follows:
V1(n, c) = θ1t (p) (n, c), (7)
V2(n, c) = θ1t (s) (n, c), (8)
V3 = θ2ASC, (9)
where we assume that the first attribute tsi (n, c) is the ex-
pected communication time per bit and the second attribute
ASC (alternative-specific constant) is a constant for alterna-
tive 3.
The attribute tsi (n, c) can be calculated as an inverse of
the instantaneous system throughput as
tsi (n, c) =
n
Qc
, (10)
where Q is the communication capacity of the system per a
channel.
We assume that the longer tsi is, the smaller the selected
probability becomes; therefore, θ1 < 0. Note that θ2 is the
parameter that indicates the strength of the influence of the
constant ASC on the utility.
From Eq. (5), the probability that a user selects the
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alternative i is given by
qi (n(p), c(p), n(s), c(s)) =
eVi (n
si ,csi )
eV1 (n(p),c(p) ) + eV2 (n(s),c(s) ) + eV3
.
(11)
2.4 Problematic Issues
Between non-cooperative providers, spectrum sharing meth-
ods usingmoney trading as amotivation for primary provider
to share spectrum have been proposed. By sharing the spec-
trum, primary providers can obtain additional profit by lend-
ing channels, and secondary providers can increase their
effective spectrum bandwidth and user throughput. In these
methods, however, providers charge connected users based
on either a price per bandwidth or an achieved throughput, so
as to guess the profit and loss caused by the spectrum sharing.
In addition, the total number of connected users is fixed, and
therefore, this environment is restrictive. Therefore, these
methods cannot apply to current widespread communica-
tion environments, for example, monthly fixed fee models.
3. Proposed Method
3.1 Spectrum Sharing Network
To reasonably trade spectrum resources under a fixed-fee
system, we propose a spectrum sharing network. It gives a
motivation of spectrum sharing and leads to efficient use of
spectrum resources. As shown in Fig. 2 where PS and SS
mean PS provider and SS provider, respectively, this network
consists of users, providers, and a broker that controls the fee
paid by users, acting as a fair mediator to both providers. The
fee distribution from the broker to providers corresponds to
the amount information transferred; thus, providers can act
under the fixed user fee model, i.e., as if they were under a
specific rent environment.
To simultaneously assign spectrum channels to more
than one secondary system without interference, the total
communication capacity must increase.
Figure 3 shows the overview of spectrum sharing pro-
cedure in the proposed network.
Each player, i.e., user, broker, primary system, and sec-
ondary system, acts as follows.
(1) User
By subscribing to a sharing network with a fixed fee be-
forehand, a user can connect to either primary or secondary
networks. In order to select the best system to connect, user
throughput should be expected beforehand. It can be real-
ized by some related works such as [25]. Figure 4 shows the
flowchart of user’s behavior.
(2) Broker
As mentioned above, the task of the broker is to collect fees
from users and dispense them to providers corresponding
Fig. 2 Spectrum sharing network.
Fig. 3 Overview of the proposed method.
Fig. 4 Flowchart of user’s behavior.
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to the quantity of consumed information. In addition, the
broker decides the unit price per information quantity to
dispense based on total quantity. The unit price for each
system should be set based onwhether the systemhas priority
for the spectrum, the extent of its coverage area, and other
services used to improve QoS (Quality of Service). For this
reason, typically, the unit price of the primary system will
be set higher than that of secondary systems.
(3) Primary System
As shown in Fig. 3, after receiving bidding price from SS
providers, PS provider decides the channel assignment to
obtain higher revenue.
Because we assume spectrum property rights, the pri-
mary system cannot use a channelwhile lending, and thereby,
decrease its throughput. The decrease will cause lower user
satisfaction. In the worst case, users leave the system. To
compensate for this loss, the primary system receives chan-
nel charges from secondary systems.
Specific procedures are proposed in 3.2.1.
(4) Secondary System
As shown in Fig. 3, each SS provider decides bidding price
to obtain an additional channel from PS provider to attract
more users.
Using the additional channels assigned by the primary
system, secondary systems intend to increase the number of
connected users. On the other hand, secondary systems must
pay the fee associated with the channels.
Specific procedures are proposed in 3.2.2.
3.2 Spectrum Assignment
As shown in Fig. 5, a spectrum channel can be assigned to
two or more secondary systems that are not adjacent to each
other. The numbers of assigned channels and target access
points are decided by the primary system based on prices
submitted by secondary systems using the following steps.
1. Each secondary system determines the payment price.
2. A primary system searches for the optimal assignment
pattern that maximizes the sum of payments offered
from secondary systems without interference.
3. Based on the profit obtained from the assignment, the
primary system decides the number of channels to as-
sign.
Because system providers getmore benefit via spectrum
trading, they must estimate their revenue to make decisions.
In other words, system providers must learn user behaviors.
θ is the dominant parameter in the supposed disaggregate be-
havioral mode. Providers gather data of alternatives chosen
by users and attributes that have an effect on user decisions,
and then, estimate parameters such that they maximize the
likelihood function (12).
Lθ =
∏
qi, (12)
where i ∈ I is the chosen alternative.
Fig. 5 Price offering and channel assignment.
3.2.1 Primary Provider’s Decision: Channel Assignment
A primary system can obtain the maximum revenue R(p) (c),
which is the sum of all rental values from the assigned sec-
ondary systems based on the number of assigned channels
c. It can be obtained by using [6]. When c is given, [6]
finds a spectrum assignment pattern that maximizes the total
throughput. In this paper, however, we use this method to
find a spectrum assignment pattern that maximizes the rev-
enue of PS by changing the objective function. Thus, the
profit of a primary system pi(p) (c) is given by
pi(p) (c) = R(p) (c) − P(p)∆N (p) (c), (13)
∆N (p) (c) = N (p) (c) − N (p) (0), (14)
where P(p) is the unit price per request sent to the primary
system by the broker and ∆N (p) (c) is the estimated number
of decrease in users connected to the primary system. Using
the connecting probability shown in Eq. (11), the number of
users who connect to the primary system is expressed as
N (p) (c) = τ
∑
a∈A
λa
∞∑
n1=0
∞∑
n2 ja=0
q1(n1, c1, n2ja, c2ja )
· pa,n1,n2 ja (c1, c2ja ), (15)
c1 = c
(p)
IN IT − c, (16)
where λa is the arrival rate of users at area a, which is as
small as the secondary coverage range; A is the coverage
area of WiMAX; τ is the time interval between channel
assignments; c(p)IN IT is the initial number of channels of the
primary system; c2ja is the number of assigned channels of
the secondary system ja in area a; and pa,n1,n2 ja is the ratio
of the number of users in area a connected to the primary
system, n1, to that of the secondary system, n2ja .
Note that by substituting the probability q shown in
Eq. (11) into Eq. (12), providers are able to predict θ based
on user choice data.
For simplicity, we approximate N (p) over a short period
τ using
N (p) (c) = τ
∑
a∈A
λaq1(n′1, c1, n
′
2ja, c2ja ), (17)
where n′1 is the time-mean value of n1 and n
′
2ja is the time-
mean value of n2ja .
Finally, a primary system determines the number of
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assignment channels used to maximize the profit. Therefore,
the value of c′ is given by
c′ = arg max pi(p) (c). (18)
3.2.2 Secondary Provider’s Decision: Price Setting
To ensure that a profit is achieved, a secondary system j
offers price x j (c) for the cth channel, which is represented
as
x j (c) = ∆R
(s)
j (c) · (1 − α j ), (19)
∆R(s)j (c) = R
(s)
j (c) − R(s)j (c − 1), (20)
where R(s)j (c) is the revenue of the secondary system j as-
signed c channels, and α j is the net income rate of the
secondary system j. Therefore, the system can achieve a
profit pi(s)j , which is calculated as
pi(s)j = ∆R
(s)
j (c)α j . (21)
Let N (s)j be the number of users connected to system j,
and P(s)j be the unit price per request set by the broker based
on the aggregate number of requests. Then, the revenue
R(s)j (c) can be represented as
R(s)j (c) = P
(s)
j N
(s)
j (c). (22)
Similarly to Eq. (15), the number of users connected to
The secondary system j, which is assigned c channels, is
given by
N (s)j (c) = τλa j
∞∑
n1=0
∞∑
n2 j=0
q2(n1, c1, n2j, c2j )
·pa j,n1,n2 j (c1, c2j ), (23)
where a j is the area of system j.
As shown in the previous section, we estimate the val-
ues of n′1 and n
′
2, which are the possible numbers of users
connected to the primary and secondary system, respectively.
Thus, N (s)j in τ can be approximated by
N (s)j (c) = τλa j q2(n
′
1, c1, n
′
2j, c2j ). (24)
4. Performance Evaluation
4.1 Simulation Model
(1) Network Topology
Figure 6 shows the network model of the WiMAX/WiFi
integrated network used in this simulation. One WiMAX
base station (BS) and 10×10 = 100 small areas are allocated
in the access area of the WiMAX system. The WiFi access
points (APs) were allocated to the small areas based on the
Fig. 6 Simulation model.
distribution rate. For example, if the distribution rate is 0.75,
100×0.75 = 75 small areas are selected at random, and each
area has a WiFi AP.
The spectrum of the WiMAX BS was divided into sev-
eral channels with widths of 20MHz. The WiMAX sys-
tem was assumed to provide 40Mbps per channel, in accor-
dance with [26]. The WiFi systems were assumed to pro-
vide 17.5Mbps per channel, according to our preliminary
experiments using NS2 [27]. Additionally, the spectrum uti-
lization, the load status of each system, the control of the
spectrum assignment, and implementation of the GA were
managed by Spectrum Manager, as shown in Fig. 6.
(2) Traffic Model
In this paper, we focus on the best-effort traffic such as data
downloading or web browsing. Users were asked to down-
load a file with a size of 10 MB. When a new mobile user
subscribed to the sharing network arrived, the user decided
whether to connect to a wireless system or not based on the
disaggregate behavioral model. When downloading com-
pleted, the mobile user left.
We assume that traffic calls occurred following a Pois-
son arrival process, and that the arrival rate depended on the
existence of the WiFi AP. Generally speaking, because WiFi
APs are installed in locations in which people gather (e.g.,
cafes, offices, and train stations), we set the call arrival rate in
an area with a WiFi AP at w times higher than that in an area
without WiFi AP. Therefore, let λa be the arrival rate of an
area with WiFi AP. The arrival rate of an area without WiFi
is set to λa/w. The arrival rate λall in the entire network in
this case is based on the arrival rate ratio w and the arrival
rate λa with WiFi as follows:
λall = (# o f areas)(1 − r) λa
w
+ rλa (25)
By assuming that secondary systems are homogeneous,
the unit price of secondary system j can be given by P(s)j =
P(s) . For simplicity, the net income rate α j is set to α j = α.
Generally speaking, because of the priority of the primary
system in the sharing spectrum, the broker in Fig. 2 sets the
unit price of the primary y times higher than that of the
secondary (y≥ 1). This situation can be represent by
1934
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P(p) = yP(s) . (26)
To predict user behaviors, providers gather data regard-
ing alternatives chosen by users; the expected communica-
tion time per bit is represented as t for their selections. Let
cMAX be the maximum number of assignment channels. Be-
cause taking the data in various conditions of the expected
time increases accuracy, we assume that the number of data
units is z and that half of the data are obtained when cMAX
channels are assigned. The other half are gathered when no
channel is assigned, such that the data is diverse.
(3) Compared Methods
To make a comparison with our method, we introduced the
existing method [6], called the cooperative method, as it is
referred to in 2.2. To improve the average throughput in the
entire network, the existing method decides the number of
assignment channels that minimizes the entire network load,
as shown in Eq. (27), and performs assignment.∑n
i=1
1
ci
ui
× ui + 1C
U
×U∑n
i=1 ui +U
(27)
Here, C denotes the WiMAX capacity, U is the number of
users who connect to WiMAX, and n indicates the number
of areas. ci is the capacity of the WiFi AP and ui is the
number of connected users, both of which exist in area i.
Note that, as we mentioned in 2.2, existing methods
[18]–[20] assume a pay-as-you-go-based charging system,
so that we cannot compare with them in the right ballpark.
(4) Performance Measures
For the performance measurement, we defined the average
download time of the entire system and the coefficient of
variance of user download time. In this simulation, smaller
average download times indicate a higher throughput.
(5) Parameters
We changed the following parameters and evaluated the pro-
posed method.
• Parameters of the network model
– Arrival rate in an area with a WiFi AP λa (in 1/s)
– Distribution rate r of WiFi APs
– Arrival rate ratiow between areaswith andwithout
a WiFi AP
– Coefficient of the disaggregate behavioral model
θ(= θ1 = θ2)
• Parameters of the spectrum assignment
– Unit price ratio between providers y
– Net income rate of secondary systems α
The following parameters were fixed.
• Parameters of the network model
– Initial number of channels of the primary system
c(p)IN IT = 5
Table 1 Default simulation parameters.
Arrival rate of the area with WiFi AP λa 0.4
Distribution rate of WiFi APs r 0.5
Arrival rate ratio x 10
Coefficient of disaggregate behavioral model θ −4
Unit price ratio between providers y 1.5
Net income rate of secondary systems α 0.1
Fig. 7 Average download time.
– Maximum number of assignment channels cMAX
= 4
– Initial number of channels of secondary system
c(s)IN IT = 1
– Bandwidth of a channel = 20MHz
• Parameters of the spectrum assignment
– Interval time of the spectrum allocation τ = 60 s
– Number of data units for the assumed parameter
of disaggregate behavioral model z = 2040
The simulationwas executed until one day of simulation
time had passed. This simulation trialwas repeated five times
and the average outputs were calculated.
Table 1 shows the default settings.
4.2 Simulation Results
4.2.1 Basic Performance
Figure 7 and Fig. 8 show the average download time and the
number of assignment channels as a function of the arrival
rate λa, respectively. The parameter θ ′, which is estimated
by each system, was θ ′1 = −4.02 and θ ′2 = −4.08. Fig-
ure 7 and Fig. 8 indicate that the cooperative method and
the proposed method improve the average download time, as
compared with the non-sharing method, based on effective
spectrum sharing. With lower arrival rate (less than 0.3),
spectrum sharing is not needed, so that the proposed method
works as well as the non-sharing method.
Figure 9 and Fig. 10 show the revenue of the primary
system and the average revenue of the secondary systems as
a function of the arrival rate. From these figures, the revenue
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Fig. 8 Average number of assignment channels.
Fig. 9 Revenue of WiMAX.
Fig. 10 Revenue of WiFi.
of both systems in the proposed method is higher than that
of the non-sharing method.
On the other hand, in cooperative method, SS providers
can use additional spectrum assigned from PS with no rental
fee, so that they obtain the highest revenue as shown in
Fig. 10. But, the revenue of PS is lower than that of the
non-sharing method as shown in 9. Therefore, we conclude
that this method is not practical.
Fig. 11 Average download time (θ = −4).
Fig. 12 Average download time (θ = −80).
4.2.2 Performance Characteristic for Different Parameters
of the Disaggregated Behavioral Model
Figure 11 and Fig. 12 show the average download time as
a function of the arrival rate for θ = −4 and θ = −80,
respectively. In these figures, the proposed method has two
lines: one is the result when systems set θ to the correct
value, and the other is the value estimated using the proposed
method. When the correct θ value is −80, the supposed
parameter θ ′ was (−23.369,−23.0). Figure 11 and Fig. 12
indicates that the proposed method decreases the average
download time relative to the non-sharing method in both
situations with the correct value of θ and the assumed value
of θ. From Fig. 12, when θ is −80, the download time of the
proposed method with the correct parameters is lower than
that of the method with the assumed parameters.
Figure 13, Fig. 14, Fig. 15, and Fig. 16 show the revenue
of the primary system and The secondary system as a func-
tion of arrival rate. Figures 13 and 15 set θ to −4. Figures 14
and 16 set θ to −80. These figures show that the revenue of
the proposed method is higher than that of the non-sharing
method.
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Fig. 13 Revenue of WiMAX (θ = −4).
Fig. 14 Revenue of WiMAX (θ = −80).
Note that, in the proposedmethod, spectrumassignment
is changed in a constant interval τ. Therefore, although the
proposed method with the correct θ decided the optimal
assignment at the beginning of τ, the assignment might not
be optimal in the latter half of τ. As a result, in some cases,
the proposed method with the correct value had less revenue
than the proposed method with the supposed value. We
conclude that the proposed method is no less efficient since
it achieves smaller download time and higher revenue of both
WiMAX and WiFi regardless of whether θ is estimated or
correct. It is a future work to overcome this situation.
4.2.3 Effect of Other Parameters
We also evaluated the effect of other parameters. We sum-
marize the results as follows.
When the distribution rate r was larger, i.e. there were
moreWiFi access points, more channels were assigned since
primary systemwere able to receive fee frommore secondary
systems. In 0.4 ≤ r ≤ 0.7, the proposed method always
achieved smaller download time and higher revenue than the
non-sharing method.
When arrival rate ratio xwas larger, more users gathered
Fig. 15 Revenue of WiFi (θ = −4).
Fig. 16 Revenue of WiFi (θ = −80).
in smaller areas. In 5 ≤ x ≤ 10, the proposedmethod always
achieved smaller download time and higher revenue than the
non-sharing method.
When the unit price ratio y was higher, less channels
were assigned since the primary provider set a high value on
the connected users. In 1.2 ≤ y ≤ 2.1, the proposed method
always achieved smaller download time and higher revenue
than the non-sharing method.
When the net income rate α was higher, less channels
were assigned since the secondary provider set the channel
prices so lower that primary provider hesitated to assign
additional channels. In 0.1 ≤ α ≤ 0.4, the proposed method
always achieved smaller download time and higher revenue
than the non-sharing method.
5. Conclusions
This paper focused on efficient spectrum use to overcome
the recent congestion of mobile networks and proposed a
new scheme for spectrum sharing. The proposed method
consists of network providers of primary systems, network
providers of secondary systems, and a broker. This paper
also proposed a reasonable decision strategy for providers.
Simulation results showed that the proposedmethod achieves
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both higher throughput and maximum provider profits.
In future work, we will consider user mobility and han-
dover.
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